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Swedish bankruptcy filing automatically terminates CEO employment and triggers an auction
of the firm. Critics of this system warn of excessive shareholder risk-shifting incentives prior to
filing. We argue that private benefits of control induce managerial conservatism that may over-
ride risk-shifting incentives. By investing conservatively, the CEO increases the joint probability
that the auction results in a going-concern sale and that she is rehired. This uniquely implies
that the rehiring probability is increasing in private control benefits, which our empirical results
support. We also find that buyers in the auction screen on CEO quality. Overall, labor market
discipline is dramatic, as filing CEOs suffer large income losses relative to CEOs of matched,
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rivals.
∗We appreciate the comments of Kenneth Eades, Cliff Holderness, Edie Hotchkiss, Mark Huson, Michael Jensen,
John Martin, Richard Ruback, and an anonymous referee of the journal. We have also received helpful suggestions
by the seminar participants at Boston College, Georgetown University, Gothenburg University, and the Norwe-
gian School of Economics and Business Administration, the Tuck CCG/JFE conference on Contemporary Corpo-
rate Governance Issues, the Utah Winter Finance Conference, and the annual meetings of the American Law and
Economics Association, the Association of Financial Economists, and the European Finance Association. Partial
financial support from the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (BRA˚), and the Norwegian Research
Council (NFR-grant no. 125105/510), is also gratefully acknowledged. Email: b.espen.eckbo@dartmouth.edu and
karin.s.thorburn@dartmouth.edu.
1 Introduction
Jensen and Meckling (1976) observe that the limited-liability feature of equity provides an incentive
for shareholders to substitute high-risk for low-risk projects during financial distress. In this paper,
we focus on the risk-shifting incentives of managers, not just of shareholders. Risk shifting requires
active participation of the chief executive officer (CEO), and we argue that the CEO may actually
prefer to invest conservatively in order to protect her private benefits of control. We explore this
argument in the context of bankruptcy filings in Sweden, where a filing summarily terminates
managerial employment contracts and places the firm in an open auction. The hard constraint on
management in this automatic auction system has caused several authors, including Aghion, Hart,
and Moore (1992), White (1996), and Hart (2000), to warn of excessive risk shifting prior to filing.
However, our empirical analysis, which explores the notion of managerial conservatism, suggest
that this warning is premature.
While risk shifting may be close to a free option for shareholders of an insolvent firm, ”going
for broke” increases the chance that the CEO loses her job. Our key argument is that, when the
CEO derives private benefits from control, she has an incentive to invest conservatively to hedge
against unfavorable bankruptcy outcomes. These unfavorable outcomes include outright company
liquidation, where the CEO position is eliminated, or reorganization as a going concern with another
CEO at the helm. Conversely, by investing conservatively, the CEO increases the chance of firm
survival and, hence, of being rehired by the buyer in the auction. Thus, we argue that the existence
of private control benefits creates a manager-shareholder conflict of interest during severe distress,
which counteracts risk shifting. Moreover, we show that this conflict arises even if the manager
owns a large equity stake in the firm.
Our focus on private benefits of control and the implication for managerial conservatism com-
plements the traditional analysis of contractual arrangements designed to regulate risk shifting
incentives. As documented in Smith and Warner (1979), contractual arrangements include debt
covenants prohibiting certain forms of asset dispositions, such as merger, sale-leaseback, and as-
set collateralization. Risk-shifting incentives are also reduced by the use of convertible debt in
the firm’s capital structure [e.g., Green (1984)]. Moreover, in countries such as Sweden and the
United States, the legal code to some extent requires company directors to shift their fiduciary
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responsibility towards bondholders when approaching bankruptcy [e.g., Gilson (1990)].
The notion that managerial incentives can produce a conservative investment policy is not new.
A substantial theoretical literature shows that managerial concern with reputational capital can
induce conservatism.1 Our contribution is to associate conservatism with the existence of manage-
rial private benefits of control, and to empirically examine incentive effects of control benefits in a
setting where they are likely to be highly relevant for the firm’s investment choices. Our argument
is made interesting by the fact that, while reputational capital is specific to the individual CEO,
private benefits of control are largely firm-specific. Furthermore, private benefits are generally non-
contractible and thus nontransferrable, except through the outright purchase of corporate control.
For example, a potentially important private benefit is the power to hide incompetence and low
work effort. Other examples of non-contractible private benefits are community prestige, perquisite
consumption, and various forms of wealth expropriation. In general, the incentive effect of such
control benefits differs from that of managerial reputational capital, which leads us to target both
in the empirical analysis below.
A key prediction of the managerial conservatism hypothesis is that the probability of the CEO
being rehired to run the restructured firm increases in her control benefits. Our empirical analysis
distinguishes between inside and outside buyers in the auction, where the former represents a
saleback to the old owner. Controlling for managerial quality, the key prediction is supported for
inside buyers. For outside buyers, we find that the rehiring probability is increasing in managerial
quality and is independent of CEO control benefits. The finding that buyers screen on CEO
quality suggests that building a reputation for quality increases the expected value of the CEO’s
control benefits. If CEO quality and control benefits are in fact complementary, this incentive
structure counteracts a tendency for private control benefits to induce value-reducing managerial
entrenchment.
We also find that bankruptcy filing results in a severe labor market disciplining of the CEO.
Using tax return information, which reflects income from all sources (not just wage), we show a large
decline in CEO income. The median income loss is -47% after controlling for the contemporaneous
income change of CEOs of nonbankrupt industry rival firms of similar size. For outside buyers,
1See, for example, Fama (1980), Harris and Holmstrom (1982), Holmstrom and Ricart I Costa (1986), Diamond
(1989), Gibbons and Murphy (1992), Brander and Poitevin (1992), Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992), and Zwiebel (1995).
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and controlling for CEO quality, the income decline increases in CEO control benefits, possibly
reflecting a concern with entrenchment. Our evidence of a large ex post settling-up effect in the
CEO’s wage is consistent with the argument of Fama (1980) that the CEO will tend toward firm-
value maximization ex ante.2
Finally, we estimate post-bankruptcy performance of the auctioned firms. A high-risk strategy
of ”going for broke” arguably results in a stripped-down firm if it fails. The firm may have lost
key employees and assets. Given that none of the sample firms is publicly traded, we use operating
profitability and bankruptcy refiling rates to indicate the economic health of the firm’s operations.
The firms sold as going-concerns appear healthy as they typically perform at par with their indus-
try rivals in the post-bankruptcy period.3 We also show that the bankruptcy refiling probability
decreases with CEO control benefits and quality. Overall, our performance evidence indicates that
buyers in the auction successfully screen on CEO quality, and it fails to support the risk-shifting
hypothesis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we model CEO investment incentives
during periods of severe financial distress and analyze the conditions under which control benefits
induce managerial conservatism. This section also develops the paper’s main testable hypotheses.
Data sources and sample characteristics are described in Section 3. Section 4 presents our empirical
analysis, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Auction bankruptcy and managerial conservatism
The CEOs of our sample firms typically own a substantial proportion of the equity (average 56%,
median 60%, discussed below). Thus, we model CEO incentives as emanating from a combination
of equity ownership, fixed wage, and private benefits of control. We first discuss our key proposition
concerning the CEO’s incentive to invest conservatively, and then summarize our main empirical
test strategy.
2This evidence complements the literature on CEO compensation changes and turnover in financially distressed
firms in the United States. See, for example, Gilson (1989), Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993), and Hotchkiss (1995).
3This finding contrasts with the evidence in Hotchkiss (1995) and Alderson and Betker (1999), which shows that
public firms emerging from Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States systematically underperform their industry
peers.
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2.1 Control benefits and investment incentives
The analysis concerns how private control benefits affect managerial investment incentives. Ap-
proaching bankruptcy, management may decide to maximize shareholder value by substituting
high-risk for low-risk assets, increasing the volatility of the firm’s asset value (riskshifting). How-
ever, since riskshifting also increases the downside risk of the firm, it increases the exposure of
the CEO to loss of private control benefits. Following bankruptcy filing, the CEO retains private
control benefits only if the firm survives bankruptcy and she is rehired by the buyer in the auction.
Control benefits are lost either if the firm is liquidated or if the buyer selects another CEO. Thus,
in contrast to shareholders, the CEO values the bankruptcy outcome in which the firm is sold as
a going concern. Consequently, the CEO may prefer a more conservative investment policy than
shareholders to preserve firm survival and hedge private control benefits.
Proposition summarizes this intuition, and lists key determinants of managerial conservatism
which are the focus of our empirical analysis:
Proposition 1 (Managerial conservatism) Suppose the CEO enjoys private benefits
of control. Following bankruptcy, the CEO maintains control benefits only if the firm
survives as a going concern and she is rehired. This generates an incentive for the CEO
to invest conservatively—relative to the preferred investment policy of shareholders—to
reduce the probability of the piecemeal liquidation outcome.
The likelihood of managerial conservatism increases with the value of private control
benefits, the rehiring probability, the probability of the piecemeal liquidation outcome in
the high-risk project relative to the low-risk project, and the degree of debt impairment.
Moreover, the likelihood of managerial conservatism decreases with the CEO wage de-
cline from bankruptcy filing and the CEO’s equity ownership in the firm.
We illustrate Proposition 1 with a simple model of a firm in financial distress. The firm has debt
outstanding with face value F due next period. It has only three assets, I dollars in cash and access
to two investment projects L (low risk) and H (high risk), each requiring an initial investment of
I today. The two projects have different outcome probability distributions but identical outcomes
next period. Fig. 1 summarizes the key characteristics of the two projects. Each project requires an
initial investment of I today and returns next period a cash flow in three states of C ∈ {0, c, 2c},
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where c > I. Let 2c > F > c, so that the firm faces bankruptcy in both the low and intermediate
states. The bankruptcy auction results in piecemeal liquidation of the firm in the low state (C = 0),
and sale as a going concern in the intermediate state (C = c). Bankruptcy costs are zero so that
the buyer in the competitive auction pays c for the firm in the intermediate state.
The probability distribution over the three cash flow states, Pr[C], is
Pri[C] =
 [p, 1− 2p, p] for i = L[p+ a, 1− 2p− (a+ b), p+ b] for i = H. (1)
Assuming risk neutrality and a discount rate normalized to zero, the value of project L is positive
(NPVL = c − I > 0). Moreover, let a > b > 0 so that the return distribution of project H
has both a higher variance and a lower expected value than the distribution of project L. Thus,
NPVL − NPVH = (a − b)c > 0, and the firm-value maximizing (efficient) investment policy is
to accept project L. In other words, in this setting, riskshifting entails selecting the lower-value
project.4 Let SL and SH denote the expected payoff to shareholders of the two projects, respectively.
With limited liability, shareholders ignore the insolvency states, and SL = p(2c − F ) and SH =
(p+ b)(2c− F ). Thus, SH > SL, and shareholders prefer the low-value but riskier project.5
The CEO leaves the firm in the low state, stays on in the high state, and is rehired with
probability α in the intermediate state. As long as she remains with the firm, the CEO derives
private benefits of control equal to β dollars. Her compensation is also a function of the fraction
τ ∈ [0, 1] she owns of the firm’s equity and of the wage decline γ dollars resulting from the negative
reputational signal of a bankruptcy filing. Here, γ = wh−wl > 0, where wh is the CEO’s wage in the
high (nonbankruptcy) state, and wl is the wage in the two bankruptcy states. The assumption that
the managerial labor market views a going-concern sale and a piecemeal liquidation as equivalent
signals of CEO quality is for convenience only. If the labor market in fact reacts more negatively to a
piecemeal liquidation than to a going-concern sale, then the incentives for managerial conservatism
increases.
4Our assumption that NPVL > NPVH is not critical. Project H could also be a mean-preserving spread of project
L (i.e., a = b so that the two projects have equal NPV ) without changing the key results below. Our scenario where
NPVL > NPVH highlights the potentially damaging effects of riskshifting on total firm value.
5If SL < I, shareholders will invest only if legal rules or the firm’s debt contracts prohibit a liquidating dividend
of I.
5
With this notation, the CEO selects the project that maximizes the total expected payoff
E(Π) = E(β) + E(w) + τS, where
Ei(Π) =
 wl + pγ + pβ + (1− 2p)αβ + τSL for i = Lwl + (p+ b)γ + (p+ b)β + (1− 2p− a− b)αβ + τSH) for i = H. (2)
Managerial conservatism follows when ∆ ≡ EL(Π)− EH(Π) > 0; i.e., when
∆ = α(
a
b
+ 1)− γ + τ(2c− F )
β
− 1 > 0. (3)
Eq. (3) illustrates the partial effects listed in Proposition 1. First, ∂∆/∂β = [γ+τ(2c−F )]/β2 > 0;
i.e., the incentive to invest conservatively is increasing in the private benefits of control β. Second,
∂∆/∂α = a/b+1 > 0. The intuition is that, the greater the rehiring probability α, the more valuable
(to the CEO) is the intermediate state, which has the highest probability of occurring under project
L. Third, ∂∆/∂(a/b) = α > 0, because the high-risk project’s probability of piecemeal liquidation
increases with a/b. Increasing the ratio a/b is akin to increasing the volatility of the value of the
firm. Hence the benefit of a conservative investment strategy designed to hedge control benefits
against the liquidation outcome. Fourth, ∂∆/∂F = τ/β > 0. As the face value F increases, 2c−F
decreases and the firm’s debt becomes more impaired, decreasing the payoff to shareholders in the
nonbankruptcy state. This reduces the value of project H relative to L and thus reduces the cost
of managerial conservatism. Fifth, ∂∆/∂γ = −1/β < 0. The greater the managerial wage decline
γ from bankruptcy, the greater value the CEO place on the solvency state and the greater the
attractiveness of project H.
Finally, ∂∆/∂τ = −(2c−F )/β < 0. Ceteris paribus, the greater the equity stake τ held by the
CEO, the greater the incentive alignment between the CEO and outside shareholders, as expected.
However, even if τ is large, the total incentive effect of the equity stake remains small for a deeply
distressed firm. In our framework, deep distress means that 2c − F is small, so that even a large
value of τ has a small effect on ∆. The intuition is as follows. Suppose financial distress is the
result of a negative shift in the firm’s investment opportunity set, moving the high investment
outcome 2c close to the face value F . The same shift in the investment opportunity set limits
shareholders’ risk-shifting opportunities, increasing the scope for private control benefits to be the
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primary determinant of managerial investment policy.
The model can be generalized to make the rehiring probability α and the wage decline γ functions
of CEO-specific characteristics such as managerial quality reputation and degree of managerial
entrenchment. For example, in Stulz (1988), a large CEO equity stake reduces firm value because
the manager prefers to retain private control benefits over receiving a takeover premium, effectively
deterring outside bids for control. In our data, the typical CEO owns a sufficient amount of equity to
block bids for control. In the context of our bankruptcy filings, however, the CEO is automatically
fired and cannot block the auction, regardless of the magnitude of τ . Also, the buyer is free to
optimally restructure the firm’s governance system. Nevertheless, it is possible that a history of
CEO entrenchment may be viewed negatively by external buyers and reduce both the CEO’s wage
offer (increase γ) and the rehiring probability α in the auction. We consider this possibility in the
empirical analysis below.
2.2 Hypotheses and empirical test strategy
The model above explains how CEO incentives ∆ to invest conservatively depends on factors such as
the private benefits of control β, the rehiring probability α, the wage loss γ from bankruptcy filing,
the CEOs equity ownership proportion τ , and the severity of financial distress 2c−F . Absent data
on either the investment incentives or the ex ante investment opportunity set (which determines
a/b), the direct effect of these variables on ∆ cannot be estimated. Instead, we examine managerial
conservatism through the lens of auxiliary hypotheses based on observable outcomes of bankruptcy
filings. As before, the fundamental idea is that managerial conservatism promotes firm survival,
and therefore survival of the CEO’s control benefits, in bankruptcy.
We focus on the rehiring probability α, the CEO wage loss γ, and post-bankruptcy firm perfor-
mance. The last is represented by operating profitability pi and the bankruptcy refiling probability
δ. We employ cross-sectional regressions of the form
yi = fi(control, quality, xi), i = α, γ, pi, δ, (4)
where control and quality are empirical proxies for private benefits of control and the CEO’s
reputation for quality, respectively, and xi is a vector of additional control variables depending on
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which of the variable yi is being used. Thus, control and quality are factors common to all of the
regressions. As explained in Section 4, both control and quality are constructed using a simple
factor representation technique.
We subsume the effect of the two remaining model parameters, the managerial ownership frac-
tion τ and the severity of financial distress (2c−F ), in the factors control and quality. According
to Proposition 1, even large values of τ have only a small manager-equityholder incentive alignment
effect when the firm is in severe distress. Thus, we posit that the main effect of τ is to enhance
private benefits of control, particularly when τ represents a controlling equity position in the firm.
Similarly, we assume that the primary role of the degree of financial distress is to affect the
CEO’s reputation for managerial quality. We proxy 2c − F in part by the firm’s ex post debt
recovery rate, based on the price paid for the firm in the auction. The presumption is that a
highly distressed firm tends to produce a low recovery in bankruptcy and that this low recovery
rate reflects negatively on the CEO’s quality reputation.
There are two distinct types of buyers in going-concern sales: Outside investors (external buyers)
and old owners (internal buyers, including the CEO). When inside buyers win the auction, we refer
to the outcome as a saleback. The greater the value of control, the greater the price the CEO is
potentially willing to bid in a saleback, providing a competitive advantage over external buyers in
the auction (see also the theoretical bidding analysis in Eckbo and Thorburn (2002)). Thus, there
are a priori reasons to believe that private control benefits are on average larger in salebacks than
for sales to external buyers. Our empirical hypotheses below exploits this intuition.
Hypothesis 1 (Rehiring probability). (1) Larger control benefits induce greater
managerial conservatism and hence increase the probability that the firm survives as
a going concern conditional on bankruptcy. (2) Conditional on a going-concern sale,
larger control benefits increase the probability that the CEO will be rehired in a saleback
but do not increase the probability of being rehired by an external buyer. (3) The rehiring
probability is increasing in managerial quality reputation.
Combining (1) and (2) of Hypothesis 1, the greater the control benefits, the higher the probability
of being rehired in a saleback than in a sale to an external buyer. Moreover, as a corollary, control
benefits will be lowest for piecemeal liquidations. As to (3) in Hypothesis 1, external buyers clearly
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have an incentive to screen CEOs on quality. In a saleback, the incentive to screen on CEO quality
comes not so much from the buyer (the CEO often rehires herself) but from outside investors asked
to finance the transaction. To check this proposition, in addition to estimating Eq. (4), we compare
the average interest charge in salebacks with that of going-concern sales to external buyers.
Hypothesis 2 (Wage loss). (1) Larger control benefits increase the risk of managerial
entrenchment and hence increase the wage loss upon bankruptcy filing. (2) The wage loss
associated with control benefits is greater for sales to external buyers than for salebacks.
(3) The wage loss is smaller the greater the CEO’s reputation for managerial quality.
Because bankruptcies are rarely just a simple consequence of bad luck, the average bankruptcy
filing is predicted to damage managerial reputation and result in a wage loss. Hypothesis 2 states
that this wage loss is driven both by the level of private control benefits and CEO quality. While an
external buyer offers the CEO a competitive wage rate, a saleback may allow the CEO to extract
rents, thus (2) of the hypothesis. In our tests, we use data on all sources of CEO income, as listed
in personal tax returns. Moreover, we benchmark the CEO income change using nonbankrupt firms
matched on industry and size.
Hypothesis 3 (Post-bankruptcy performance). Managerial conservatism reduces
risk shifting, preserves the firm’s assets, and thus increases the firm’s post-bankruptcy
performance.
A failed risk-shifting strategy results in loss of assets and a depletion of going-concern value. By
tempering risk-shifting incentives ex ante, managerial conservatism increases the likelihood that
the firm, if it goes bankrupt, enters bankruptcy with its assets intact. This simplifies efforts to
restructure the firm as a viable going concern. Absent data on either pre-filing asset disposi-
tions or the true state of the bankrupt firm’s assets (other than recovery rates), we explore this
implication of managerial conservatism through post-bankruptcy performance measures such as
operating performance and the probability of bankruptcy refiling. Because evidence of a strong
post-bankruptcy accounting performance does not discriminate between managerial conservatism
leading to a good asset base in bankruptcy and simply skilful restructuring of poor assets in the
absence of conservatism, this analysis is exploratory in nature.6
6None of our sample firms is publicly traded, precluding a performance analysis using equity returns. Moreover,
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3 Data sources and sample characteristics
This section provides descriptive information on the characteristics of Swedish bankruptcy auctions,
as well as of the filing firms and their CEOs. When filing for bankruptcy, all debt service is stayed,
and a trustee is appointed by the court to run an open auction. The trustee normally hires
an outside consultant or retains the incumbent CEO on a temporary basis to oversee the firm’s
operations until the sale is completed. Bids may be submitted for individual assets (piecemeal
liquidation) or for the entire firm as a going concern. Bids must be in cash, and the proceeds are
distributed strictly according to absolute priority. The auctions typically attract substantial bidder
interest, and the entire process is swift, with an average of 2 months to completion. See Thorburn
(2000) and Eckbo and Thorburn (2002) for comprehensive evidence on costs, duration, and bidding
strategies in our Swedish bankruptcy auctions.
3.1 Data sources
We start by adding information on firm and CEO characteristics in the sample of 263 Swedish
bankruptcy cases originally compiled by Thorburn (2000). The sample, which consists of bankruptcy
filings between January 1, 1988 and December 31, 1991, is identified using the proprietary database
of UpplysningsCentralen (UC). To be included, the filing firm must have at least 20 employees.
There are a total of 1,159 firms in the UC database satisfying the above criteria. Of these, 581
firms are eliminated because the filing was in a remote geographical area, while another 315 cases
are excluded for one of the following additional reasons: The case is still pending in bankruptcy
as of June 30, 1995 (145 cases); there are tax fraud charges (59 cases); or the bankruptcy file is
incomplete (111 cases).7 Of the 263 cases in the sample, 9 filings occurred in 1988, 27 in 1989,
71 in 1990, and 156 in 1991. The auction results in 200 firms sold as going concern, 60 piecemeal
liquidations, while 3 cases have insufficient information to be classified by outcome. Throughout
a more complete performance analysis would condition on changes in the firm’s asset structure in the period prior
to bankruptcy, requiring data that are chronically hard to come by. As reported by, e.g., John, Lang, and Netter
(1992), John and Ofek (1995), Andrade and Kaplan (1998), and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Wruck (2002), asset sales
are common among distressed firms in the United States.
7The sample is limited to firms located in the four largest provinces in Sweden: Stockholms la¨n, Go¨teborg- and
Bohus la¨n, Malmo¨hus la¨n, and Upplands la¨n. This restriction economizes on the cost of physical travel to each
jurisdiction where bankruptcy files are stored. While the firm’s assets are quickly auctioned off in bankruptcy, the
old and empty corporate shell typically remains on file with the court for several years. This is a formality that has
no implications for the sale of the firm’s assets in the auction.
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the paper, a going-concern sale is defined as a joint sale of the assets that are essential for the
firm’s continued operations. Examples of such assets are inventory, machinery, vehicles, unfinished
products, intangible assets, industrial estate, and rental contracts.
For each firm in the sample, we add information on firm- and case-specific characteristics iden-
tified from the public court record. For 260 firms, the identity of the incumbent CEO is found by
matching information in the court records with UC-supplied information on board membership.
UC also supplied financial statements from the period 1987-1995 for the entire Swedish population
of 16,000 firms with at least 20 employees that were either operating on December 31, 1991 or pend-
ing in bankruptcy. We use this information to calculate industry median operating performance
and distress measures.
From the UC database, we construct post-bankruptcy financial statements for 158 firms auc-
tioned as a going concern. For 42 going-concern sales, we could not identify the firm post-
bankruptcy. Moreover, UC provides the individual tax returns for 258 of the sample firms’ CEOs
for the years 1988-1991 and 1993-1994. There are some limitations in the UC database: The 1990
and 1991 tax returns are available for a subset of 130 of the sample CEOs, while the 1992 tax
returns is unavailable for all. For comparison purposes, tax returns for the period 1988-1994 are
also obtained for a randomly selected sample of CEOs of 1,346 nonbankrupt Swedish firms with at
least 20 employees.
3.2 Sample characteristics
Table 1 lists several key characteristics of the sample firms. All firms are privately held and small,
with average sales of $5.0 million, total assets (size) of $2.4 million, and 43 employees. The small
firm size is a general feature of the Swedish economy and not of our sampling procedure. The
sample represents more than 30 two-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) groups. Twenty-
nine percent (76) of the firms are in manufacturing industries, while another 13% (33 firms) are
in the construction industry. Thirty firms are in the wholesale business, while there are 26 firms
(10%) in each of the hotel and restaurant industry and in the transportation industry.
Panel A of Table 1 lists selected financial characteristics for the sample firms. With the ex-
ception of the fraction secured debt, the source of this information is the last financial statement
reported prior to the bankruptcy filing, which on average dates back 17.5 months (median 16.5
11
months). As expected, the firms perform poorly prior to bankruptcy with an average operating
profitability (EBITDA to total sales) of -1% (median 2%). Industry-adjusted, the operating prof-
itability (profmarg) averages -6% with a median of -4%, both significantly different from zero at
the 1% level. Industry-adjusted means that we are subtracting the contemporaneous median oper-
ating profitability of all Swedish firms with at least 20 employees in the same four-digit SIC code as
the sample firm. The average number of rival firms per industry used in this industry adjustment
is 299 (median 273), with a minimum of 20. Also as expected, filing firms have high leverage ratios.
The average ratio of total book debt to total book assets is 92% (median 93%), and the average
interest coverage ratio (EBITDA plus interest income divided by interest expense) is -2.3 (median
1.0).
Absent data on the market value of equity for the private firms, we use the fraction of secured
debt (secured) as a proxy for the proportion tangible assets. This implicitly assumes that firms
tend to lever up their tangible assets and that the cross-sectional variation in total leverage ratios
is small. The fraction secured debt, which averages 39%, is identified from the bankruptcy file.8
Thorburn (2000) shows that the greater the proportion of secured debt, the higher the probability
of piecemeal liquidation. Eckbo and Thorburn (2002) find that auction premiums in excess of the
piecemeal liquidation value of assets tend to be significantly lower the greater the fraction of secured
debt. Both of these observations are consistent with greater secured debt being a proxy for lower
going-concern value, which is what we want.
Panel B of Table 1 lists personal characteristics of the CEO. As indicated by the variable tenure,
65% of the filing CEOs have been employed as CEO for at least two years. In other words, over
the two-year period prior to filing, 35% of the CEOs are replaced. The firms exhibit concentrated
share ownership, with a single shareholder typically controlling 50% or more of the equity. This
controlling shareholder is often the CEO. As shown in the table, the average CEO equity ownership
(ownership) is 57%, with a median of 60%.9 Furthermore, as shown in Fig. 2, the distribution of
ownership is skewed with 88 CEOs (43%) owning 100% of the firm’s shares. Moreover, the CEOs
of 50 firms (25%) own no equity, with a fairly even distribution between 0% and 100%. The typical
8The debt structure of our Swedish companies is typically simple: Approximately 90% of the secured debt is
bank-debt; there are no firms with public debt; and basically all nonsecured claims have identical priority (with the
exception of wages and taxes).
9We have information on CEO ownership for 205 of the 263 firms. Our CEO ownership data include the ownership
of the CEO’s spouse and children with the same last name. Such nonCEO family ownership is negligible.
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CEO is 20 years from retirement at the time of filing, with an average age (age) of 45 (median 46).
Finally, based on the income tax return two years prior to filing, the average CEO total income
before tax is $40,000.10 Thus, given the equity ownership information above, the typical CEO’s
wealth exposure to the equity value of the firm is substantial.
Panel C of Table 1 provides information on auction characteristics. Upon filing, the trustee is
required to provide an estimate of when the firm became insolvent and could potentially have filed
for bankruptcy. The variable delay, which is the number of months between this first insolvency
date and the bankruptcy filing date, averages 4.8 months (median 4.0 months). That is, in the
opinion of the trustee, the typical filing firm delayed filing by only four months. We believe that
this relatively short delay undermines the notion of substantial risk-shifting and asset-stripping
activities following severe financial distress in the filing firms.11
The trustee is required to provide an assessment of the reason for the bankruptcy filing. As
shown in the table, the trustee concludes in 32% of the cases that the filing is a result of CEO
incompetence or economic crime (inept). Below, we use this information, together with variables
for filing delay, operating profitability, and debt recovery rate, to construct an empirical proxy
for CEO reputation. The debt recovery rate in percent of the face value of total debt (recovery)
averages 35% (median 33%).
Finally, Panel D reports the degree of industry distress at the time of the sample bankruptcy
filings (distress). Industry distress is defined as the fraction of firms in the four-digit industry of
the filing firm that have an interest coverage ratio of less than one in the year of the filing or file
for bankruptcy the following year. With this definition, on average 42% of firms in the industry
are distressed (median 38%). Thus, the typical firm in our sample files for bankruptcy at a time
when a substantial number of its competitors are also financially distressed.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we estimate the empirical model in Eq. (4) and use the coefficient estimates to
test hypotheses 1 through 3. We start with the construction of proxies for the variables control
10This exceeds the average per capita income in Sweden during the sample period, which is predominantly from
1988-1989. The sample maximum CEO income is $720,000.
11Most firms in our sample file for bankruptcy after running out of liquidity and defaulting on their debt payments.
In excess of 90% of the filings are made by the firm’s management, with the remaining filed by a creditor.
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and quality. We then proceed with interpreting the regression results for the rehiring probability
(Hypothesis 1), the CEO income loss (Hypothesis 2), and post-bankruptcy performance (Hypothesis
3).
4.1 Factor representation of CEO quality and private control benefits
Constructing proxies for control and quality is not straightforward. One approach is to include
as explanatory variables a number of individual, observable characteristics that are believed to
reflect quality and control aspects. This necessitates interpretation of a large number of individual
regression coefficients of typically correlated characteristics, which is problematic.12 We instead
implement a simple factor-analytic approach to summarize the information in the characteristics.
The construction of the factors control and quality goes as follows. First, we designate key
characteristics, as defined in Table 1. Second, using generally available empirical evidence, as well
as our own economic intuition, we determine a priori the coefficient on each characteristic to be
either 1 or -1. Third, we create a value for each of the two factors by summing the characteristics.
The value of each characteristic falls in the range |0, 1|, so that each has a commensurable impact
on the total factor value. If the underlying characteristic itself does not fall in this range, then the
characteristic is transformed, as indicated by un asterisk (*).
The factor control is constructed as the sum of four characteristics:
control = ownership+ tenure− secured− size∗. (5)
Motivated by the discussion in Section 2, we constrain the characteristics ownership and tenure
to enter with positive sign. Basically, the greater the ownership fraction and the longer the CEO’s
tenure, the greater the opportunity to extract private benefits. The positive sign for ownership
is also motivated by studies documenting that CEO turnover in large U.S. corporations tends to
decrease in managerial equity ownership, e.g., Ofek (1993), Denis and Denis (1994), Denis, Denis,
and Sarin (1997), and Mikkelson and Partch (1997).
Moreover, we constrain control to decrease in asset tangibility (secured). As argued by Dyck
and Zingales (2001) as well, it is more costly to expropriate tangible than intangible assets. Finally,
12We pursued this approach in an earlier version of this paper. The results are available upon request.
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the variable size∗ = [ln(size) − µs]/σs, where µs and σs are the mean and standard deviation
of ln(size), respectively, is constrained to have a negative sign. CEOs of smaller firms are often
required to carry out a multitude of different tasks throughout the organization, which we conjecture
provides a greater scope for extracting private control benefits. There is also substantial extant
evidence that managerial turnover increases in firm size.
Turning to quality, we construct this factor using another set of four characteristics, all observ-
able by the buyer in the auction:
quality = recovery∗ + profmarg − inept− delay∗. (6)
The positive sign for the transformed debt recovery rate, recovery∗ = √recovery, and for the
industry-adjusted operating profitability, profmarg, is consistent with the evidence in, e.g., Warner,
Watts, and Wruck (1988), Weisbach (1988), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), and Mikkelson
and Partch (1997) of a lower CEO turnover in high-performing firms. In addition to serving as an
indicator of CEO quality, the variable recovery captures the quality of the bankrupt firm’s assets.
Under either interpretation, greater values of recovery∗ are assumed to increase the value of the
factor quality. Finally, we constrain inept and delay∗ =
√
delay/σd, where σd is the standard
deviation of delay, to enter with a negative sign. The negative sign for delay∗ is intended to reflect
that asset substitution, restructuring, and other capital-raising activities designed to stay out of
bankruptcy are more time consuming for lower-quality CEOs.
4.2 The CEO rehiring probability
We have information on the rehiring outcome for 170 of the 200 sample firms sold as going concern.
In this subsample, a total of 86 CEOs (51%) are rehired. The rehiring rate is greater in salebacks
than in sales to outside investors, 70% (79 of 112) versus 12% (7 of 58).13 Adding the sample of 60
piecemeal liquidations (where the CEO position is eliminated) to the going-concern sales, the total
percentage rehired is 39%, or a turnover rate of 61%. This is similar to turnover rates reported
by Gilson (1989) for Chapter 11 filings in the United States. Gilson reports that of the senior
13The decision to hire an outside CEO in a saleback typically coincides with the old owner not being the CEO.
Also, the old CEO does not always own equity in the firm prior to bankruptcy and thus does not necessarily influence
the rehiring decision in a saleback. See Fig. 2.
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managers in place in year -2, 45% remain in their positions at filing (year 0) while only 29% remain
by year +2 (roughly coinciding with the time the firm emerges from Chapter 11 proceedings). See
also the turnover evidence in Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993), LoPucki and Whitford (1993), Betker
(1995), and Hotchkiss (1995).
We specify the rehiring probability α as a function of the factors quality and control and the
two variables age and distress. As defined in Table 1, distress is the degree of industry wide
financial distress. The factors control and quality are largely uncorrelated and are uncorrelated
with the industry distress variable distress. This is partly a reflection of the fact that we have
purged the median industry performance from profmarg. Moreover, separate regressions confirm
that recovery, as well as each of the individual characteristics in control, are uncorrelated with
industry distress variables. Thus, including control, quality, and distress on the right-hand side
of the same regression does not induce multicollinearity.
Several U.S. studies, e.g., Weisbach (1988), Murphy and Zimmerman (1993), Mikkelson and
Partch (1997), and Goyal and Park (2002), find that CEO age is a significant determinant of CEO
turnover. Thus, we use the variable age to control for the CEO’s age at filing. In our data, age is
uncorrelated with the indicator variable tenure used to construct the factor control. Controlling
for CEO quality and control benefits, the probability of rehiring is expected to be lower the closer
the CEO is to retirement age.
The empirical model and sign predictions are as follows:
α = f(control, quality, age, distress) (7)
∂α
∂control
> 0,
∂α
∂quality
> 0,
∂α
∂age
< 0,
∂α
∂distress
< 0.
The coefficient values resulting from the probit estimation is shown in Table 2. The estimation is
performed using two samples for which we have sufficient information on all the variables. The
first is 112 going-concern sales, and the second adds 38 piecemeal liquidations for a total of 150
cases. We report two models. Model 1 uses the four explanatory variables in Eq. (7). Model
2 classifies the factors quality and control in going-concern sales according to whether the buyer
in the auction is the old owner (saleback) or a company outsider (external), and it includes an
interaction variable for piecemeal liquidations (piecemeal).
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The models in Table 2 have significant explanatory power, with pseudo-R2 ranging from 8%
(Model 1) to 30% (Model 2). Several of the coefficient estimates are as predicted by Hypothesis
1. First, the coefficient for control is positive and significant (Model 1). Second, Model 2 shows
that the positive effect of control is restricted to salebacks, indicating that the incentive of owner-
managers to repurchase the company is increasing in managerial control benefits. This result is
predicted by managerial conservatism but not by risk-shifting arguments (where control benefits
do not play a role).
Hypothesis 1 also predicts that outside buyers associate large control benefits with managerial
entrenchment, which for a given value of quality lowers their incentive to rehire the CEO. Given
the insignificant coefficient on control ∗ external, this prediction is not supported. The coefficient
on control ∗ piecemeal is significantly negative and significantly lower than for either control ∗
saleback or control∗external. Thus, managerial control benefits are on average lowest for piecemeal
liquidations and perhaps too small for the old owner-manager to undertake a saleback of these
firms. This evidence is also consistent with our basic theory that ex ante control benefits affect the
bankruptcy outcome.
The variable quality is positive and significant at the 2% level or better in Model 1, indicating
that the buyers in the auction screen the old CEOs on quality before making the rehiring decision.
As shown when using Model 2, the significance of quality reflects screening by the external (outside)
buyer, while managerial quality is insignificant in a saleback to the old owner. This suggests that
screening on CEO quality, while important to the outside buyer, is of secondary importance for
an owner-manager, perhaps because she repurchases the company to preserve control benefits.
However, as shown in Section 4.3, a lack of screening can be costly. Salebacks have typically higher
cost of debt financing than sales to outside investors, possibly reflecting a perception among banks
of lower average CEO quality in saleback transactions.
The coefficient on quality ∗ piecemeal is insignificant. Given that the CEO is never rehired
when the firm is liquidated, this suggests that the average CEO quality in firms that are liquidated
is indistinguishable from the overall sample mean quality (conditional on Model 2). In other
words, we cannot conclude that firms end up being liquidated (as opposed to purchased as going
concerns) simply because of poor managerial quality. As discussed in Maksimovic and Phillips
(1998), bankrupt firms divest their plants as a function of industry conditions. In our context, if
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bankruptcy is the result of declining product market demand, a decision to liquidate could be taken
independently of CEO quality.
The industry distress variable, distress, receives a negative coefficient that is significant at the
7% level or better in all four model specifications. Industry distress could lower industry insiders’
(the owner-manager or rival firms) interest in the auction. The lower the demand from industry
insiders, the lower the probability that the CEO is rehired. Finally, the variable age is insignificant.
This may be a reflection of the relatively young age of the CEOs in our sample (mean 45). Replacing
age with a dummy variable for age 59 or older also produces an insignificant coefficient. Thus,
although we would expect CEOs close to retirement age to leave the firm voluntarily following
bankruptcy filing, this effect does not influence our coefficient estimates.14
In sum, the results in Table 2 provide support for the key prediction of Hypothesis 1: The
CEO rehiring probability α increases with private benefits of control in salebacks. In addition, the
rehiring probability increases with outside reputation for quality and decreases with industrywide
distress.
4.3 The CEO income loss
In the model of Section 2, the parameter γ represents the CEO’s wage reduction from bankruptcy
filing. Hypothesis 2 is, however, stated more broadly in terms of the CEO income loss from all
sources. A loss of reputation may affect the CEO’s external income as well, including outside fees
from consultancy, board memberships, etc. This information is provided by the individual tax
returns for a total of 258 of our sample CEOs. The tax returns also allow us to follow the CEO’s
income after she leaves the company, and we focus on the time series of income change over the
event period year −3 through year 5, where year 0 is the year of the bankruptcy filing.
We measure the rate of income change in two ways. The first uses data on the filing CEOs
only and is computed as ∆ct = (ct − ct−1)/ct−1, where ct is a CEO’s net income before tax in
year t. (Because capital losses are not deductible against salary income in Sweden, ∆ct reflects the
full salary loss of the CEO.) The second is the abnormal CEO’s income change, measured relative
to the contemporaneous CEO income change ∆dt in a matched nonbankrupt firm of similar total
14As argued by Brickley, Linck, and Coles (1999), the labor market time horizon of CEOs could extend beyond
formal retirement age. They find that greater CEO reputation (measured using firm performance) increases the
likelihood of future board directorships.
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asset size and in the same four-digit SIC industry. The abnormal CEO income change is defined as
∆c∗t = ∆ct−∆dt. The control firms are selected from the random population of 1,346 nonbankrupt
firms described at the end of Section 3.1.
Fig. 3 provides a visual impression of the significant income difference that develops between
filing and nonfiling CEO as of the year of bankruptcy filing. The figure plots an index of the annual
taxable CEO income, denoted cˆt. The index value is normalized to 100 in year -3 and is computed
as cˆt = cˆt−1∆cmt for subsequent years, where ∆cmt is the sample median of ∆ct. The index value
for nonfiling CEOs is computed the same way, with d replacing c everywhere. The top curve in
the graph is the index value for the control sample of nonbankrupt firms, while the lower curve
is the index value for the CEOs of bankrupt firms. As shown, the incomes of filing and nonfiling
CEOs grow at approximately the same rate up until bankruptcy filing. Then, over the subsequent
three years (year 0 through year 2), filing CEOs show a sharp income decline while nonfiling CEOs’
income continues to grow at about the same rate as before. After year 2, the incomes of the two
categories of CEOs again grow at similar rates. In other words, bankruptcy filing seems to produce
a large and permanent income loss for the filing CEO relative to the top management of nonfiling
industry competitors.
From inspection of Fig. 3, it is natural to focus on the event period from year -2 through year
3 as capturing the full income change differential between filing and nonfiling CEOs. The median
and mean values of the abnormal income change ∆c∗−2,3 are -47.0% and -66.1%, respectively. Using
a nonparametric sign test for the median and a t-test for the mean, both numbers are significantly
different from zero on a 1% level. As predicted, bankruptcy induces a statistically significant income
loss for CEOs of filing firms, relative to the contemporaneous income change of CEOs of matched,
nonbankrupt companies.
Next, we estimate a cross-sectional regression model for the income loss γ ≡ ∆c−2,3. Because
Hypothesis 2 predicts that γ depends on CEO control benefits, we use the same regression specifi-
cation as for the rehiring model (Eq. 7 and Table 2):
γ = f(control, quality, age, distress) (8)
∂γ
∂control
> 0,
∂γ
∂quality
< 0,
∂γ
∂age
> 0,
∂γ
∂distress
> 0.
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The results are in Table 3. Because of data constraints on primarily the income variable, the
regression employs a total of 114 cases, 85 going-concern sales and 29 liquidations. The regression
models have low explanatory power, with adjusted R2 for Model 2 of 4% and 6%, respectively.
With the exception of control, the regressors receive statistically insignificant coefficients. Thus,
the income decline, while large and significant on average, does not depend on CEO quality, CEO
age, or industry distress.
The coefficient on control is positive and significant for the subsample of going-concern sales
(Model 1), with a p-value of 8%. Thus, greater control benefits lowers the CEO’s wage upon
bankruptcy filing, possibly because high control benefits are associated with greater CEO entrench-
ment. This interpretation is reinforced by the significance of control ∗ external, where the p-value
is less than 2% in the total sample regression as well as in the regression based on the subsample
of going-concern sales. In sum, the CEO income decline is greater when the firm is purchased by
a company outsider, as predicted by Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2 also predicts that the CEO wage decline should occur for salebacks as well as
for sales to outsiders. The median, industry-adjusted wage decline (∆c∗−2,3) is -25% for salebacks
and -57% for sales to company outsiders, with the difference being statistically insignificant. Thus,
retaining control through a saleback does not hedge against a CEO income decline. A possible
reason for this wage decline is that the saleback firm is relatively cash-constrained because of
higher cost of external (debt) financing given the potentially greater CEO entrenchment and lower
CEO quality in salebacks. If so, the greater cost of debt constrains the CEO’s ability to maintain
her wage at the pre-bankruptcy level.
To gauge the role of outside financing costs, we compare interest expense across salebacks and
sales to outsiders over the year following the auction. The ratio of interest expense to the face
value of total debt averages 7.4% for salebacks and 5.3% for sales to outsiders, the difference being
statistically significant at a 5% level (two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test). The source of this
greater cost of debt is not greater leverage in salebacks. For year 1, the median leverage ratio
(book total debt over book assets) is 0.90 for salebacks and 0.91 for nonsalebacks.
To our knowledge, this study is the first to document compensation changes of individual CEOs
after they leave the firm. Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) compare the compensation given old and
new CEOs following distressed restructurings and Chapter 11 bankruptcy. They report that if the
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CEO is replaced by an outsider, the median new CEO receives a cash compensation (salary and
bonus) that is 36% higher than her predecessor, indicating a substantial wage differential to a CEO
untainted by bankruptcy and distress. Moreover, if the CEO is replaced by an insider with ties to
the previous management, the new CEO receives on average 35% lower cash compensation than the
outgoing CEO. Thus, CEOs involved in distressed reorganizations appear to experience significant
compensation declines in both Sweden and the United States.
4.4 Post-bankruptcy performance
In this section, we report post-bankruptcy operating performance, leverage ratios, and bankruptcy
refiling probabilities. This information helps gauge the likelihood that the firm is severely and irre-
versibly run down by prefiling risk shifting and asset stripping and whether the automatic auction
process itself efficiently restructures the firm. As stated in Hypothesis 3, managerial conservatism
reduces risk shifting and increases post-bankruptcy performance.
Post-bankruptcy performance estimation requires identification of the new restructured firm.
Using information from the bankruptcy file and UC, a total of 158 of the going-concern sales could
be identified post-bankruptcy. Of these, post-bankruptcy financial statements are available for 115
firms. Table 4 lists five performance and growth measures, adjusted for industry median, for this
sample: Annual operating profitability (EBITDA/sales), sales growth, growth in total (book value)
assets, the ratio of capital expenditure (change in property, plant, and equipment from last year
plus the current year’s depreciation) to total assets, and book value of total debt to total assets.
The table reports median values with and without an adjustment for the industry median. The
industry-adjusted value is the median of the difference between the firm and its median industry
rival, where a rival is a firm with at least 20 employees in the same four-digit SIC industry as the
bankrupt company.
Using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, the median industry-adjusted operating profitability is in-
distinguishable from zero at a 5% level in each of the five years following bankruptcy, as predicted
by Hypothesis 3. Computing operating profitability using total assets instead of sales produces
identical inferences. By year 5, 63% of the surviving sample firms perform better than the me-
dian industry benchmark firm. Moreover, the growth rates in sales and assets are at par with the
respective industry medians. The growth rate series start in year 1 as no financial statement is
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available for the restructured firm in the year of the auction; i.e., year 0.
The level of capital expenditures is significantly above the industry median in year 2 (the first
year of measurement) and converges to the industry level by year 3. Also, the auctioned firms
emerge more highly leveraged than their industry rivals (median debt/assets of 0.90 versus 0.80 in
year 1), and they tend to stay highly leveraged through year 4. While not shown in Table 4, the
relatively high debt level is also reflected in a lower than industry interest coverage ratio. Overall,
the information in Table 4 indicates that firms emerging as going concerns from auction bankruptcy
are more highly levered but perform, grow, and invest at the level of their industry rivals. Studying
firms emerging from Chapter 11, Gilson (1997) also finds that debt levels remain high.
Next, we ask whether the industry-adjusted operating profitability pit cumulated over years
t = 1 and t = 2 are affected by our quality and control factors, using the following regression
model:
e
∑t
1 pit = f(control, quality, distress, merger), t = 1, 2, (9)
∂e
∑t
1 pit
∂control
> 0,
∂e
∑t
1 pit
∂quality
> 0,
∂e
∑t
1 pit
∂distress
< 0,
∂e
∑t
1 pit
∂merger
> 0.
Here, merger is a dummy variable indicating that the buyer in the auction merged the bankrupt
firm into another going concern (and not into an empty corporate shell). Approximately one-third
of the going-concern sales were merged into an existing going concern. The variablemerger controls
for possible synergy effects of the acquiror’s existing assets. We focus on years 1 and 2 only, as the
impact of the prefiling characteristics in control and quality on the subsequent performance of the
restructured firm are greatest in the early years.
We use Eq. (9) to investigate whether the cross-sectional variation in the old CEOs control
benefits and quality help explain the auctioned firms’ industry-adjusted operating profitability.
Under Hypothesis 3, high-quality managers with high control benefits exhibit conservatism in their
pre-bankruptcy choices. Coupled with effective screening by the (external) buyer in the auction,
the presumption is that this conservatism makes it easier to restructure the firm and run it in a
profitable manner post-bankruptcy. Thus, a corollary of Hypothesis 3 is that the industry-adjusted
operating performance is increasing in control and quality.
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The results are in Table 5. Because of data constraints on post-bankruptcy financial statements,
the regression employs a total of 66 going-concern sales. The adjusted R2 ranges from 4% (Model
2) to 10% (Model 1). The factor control is insignificant in all four models. However, quality
receives a significantly positive coefficient in year 1 (Model 1), which is consistent with Hypothesis
3. Model 2 in year 1 shows that the significance of quality is greatest in the sample of salebacks.
This result is intuitive because, in our framework (and supported by the results in Table 2), there
is more extensive screening on CEO quality when the buyer is external. Effective screening tends
to eliminate the cross-sectional correlation between quality (measured using the pre-bankruptcy
CEOs) and subsequent post-bankruptcy performance within the sample of firms sold to external
buyers. Conversely, with less screening in the sample of salebacks, the resulting wider distribution
of CEO qualities in this sample produces a significant coefficient estimate on quality. Table 5 also
shows that the cumulative performance over years 1 and 2 is increasing in the variable is merger.
That is, merging the bankrupt firm with the buyer’s assets appears to improve the subsequent
two-year industry-adjusted operating performance.
Finally, we examine our second measure of post-bankruptcy performance: the likelihood δ
that the restructured firm is forced to refile for bankruptcy. Again, pre-bankruptcy managerial
conservatism is predicted to increase survival; i.e., to reduce the refiling probability. In our sample
of 158 identified post-bankruptcy firms, a total of 39 (25%) refile for bankruptcy within two years,
and 59 (37%) within five years. The median time to refiling is 20 months (average 23). These refiling
rates are higher than the 19% five-year filing frequency for the overall population of Swedish firms
with 20 employees or more over the same time period.15 Table 6 estimates, using the explanatory
variables in Eq. (9), the probability of refiling for 94 going-concern sales over 1, 2, and 3 years
following bankruptcy.16 The probit regressions are significant for years 2 and 3 (Chi-square test)
with values of the pseudo-R2 ranging from 9% (Model 1) to 13% (Model 2). The insignificance of
the year 1 regression is not surprising given the proximity to the auction itself (the median refiling
firm files in 20 months).
Focusing on the year 2 regression (the results are similar for year 3), greater values for both
15The source of the general filing rate is Statistics Sweden. Our sample period covers a severe business downturn
in the fall of 1991, causing the annual bankruptcy filing rate for firms with at least 20 employees in Sweden to peak
at 6% in 1992.
16The sample size is up from 66 in Table 5 as the regressions in Table 6 do not require post-bankruptcy financial
statements. We also ran the estimation for years 4 and 5, with similar results.
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control and quality lower the probability of refiling. The significance of control in Model 2, year 2, is
predominantly driven by the subsample of external buyers. External buyers have a greater incentive
to screen on CEO quality, which by itself improves post-bankruptcy performance. The significance
of control ∗ external further implies that, within the sample of external buyers, the greater the
private benefits of control, the lower the chance of refiling. This is consistent with Hypothesis
3 where greater control benefits leads to greater pre-bankruptcy managerial conservatism, which
in turn improves the firm’s chance of long-term survival. Also, as with the earlier regression on
operating performance, the significance of quality is driven by the subsample of salebacks. The
intuition for this result is identical to the one given above for Table 5: There is more extensive
screening of CEO quality when the buyer is external, eliminating the correlation between quality
and subsequent post-bankruptcy performance.17
Overall, the evidence in Tables 4-6 indicates that the typical restructured firm performs at
par with its industry rivals. The operating performance increases in quality, while the refiling
probability is decreasing in both quality and control. These findings are consistent with the joint
hypothesis of managerial conservatism ex ante and efficient screening on CEO quality in the auction.
The evidence provides little support for the alternative view that the auction bankruptcy system
induces costly risk-shifting and asset-stripping activities to avoid bankruptcy.
In contrast to our findings for Swedish small-firm bankruptcies, Hotchkiss (1995) reports that
a sample of 197 public firms emerging from Chapter 11 significantly underperform industry rivals
over a five-year post-bankruptcy period. Moreover, operating profitability suffers, and bankruptcy
refiling probability is increased, when the reorganized firm retains the old management. (In her
sample, 32% of the firms refile for bankruptcy or initiate a private debt workout within five years.)
Overall, she finds little evidence to support the hypothesis that distressed firms are effectively
rehabilitated in Chapter 11.
5 Conclusions
We present a simple model demonstrating that CEO private benefits of control complement manage-
rial reputation, compensation schemes, and financial contracts in counteracting costly shareholder
17As shown in an earlier version of the paper, the refiling probability does not depend on whether the auctioned
firm is run by the old CEO or an outsider.
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risk-shifting incentives during financial distress. The implied managerial conservatism in project
selection attenuates agency costs of debt and benefits shareholders ex ante. We take this model to
a sample of bankruptcy filings in Sweden, where a filing summarily terminates managerial employ-
ment contracts and automatically puts the firm up for auction. The hard constraint on management
makes this an ideal laboratory for examining the opposing theories of risk shifting and managerial
conservatism prior to filing. While we do not have data on specific prefiling project choices or
asset substitutions, the theory predicts that managerial concern with maintaining private benefits
of control will manifest itself in the buyer’s decision to rehire the CEO, the CEO income loss from
filing, and the post-bankruptcy performance of the restructured firm.
Our empirical analysis employs two factors representing private benefits of control and CEO
quality reputation. The factors, which are constructed using a set of characteristics that are
observable to the buyer in the bankruptcy auction, turn out to significantly determine the CEO
rehiring probability, as predicted. Greater levels of control benefits increase the probability of a
saleback of the firm to the old owner-manager. Moreover, we find that the probability that an
external buyer will rehire the manager increases with the manager’s quality reputation. Thus, the
greater the managerial quality, the greater the expected value of her private control benefits. This
incentive structure tends to alleviate concerns that private control benefits also promote managerial
entrenchment.
Using personal tax returns (publicly available in Sweden), we also are able to track the CEO’s
income after she leaves the firm. We find that a bankruptcy filing is a costly event: The median
CEO income change around bankruptcy is -47% in excess of the contemporaneous income change
for a control sample of CEOs of nonbankrupt firms matched on industry and firm size. The income
loss of a filing CEO does not vary with our CEO quality factor. Thus, it does not appear that
high-quality CEOs avoid the wrath of the labor market following bankruptcy filing. Conditional
on CEO quality, the CEO income loss increases with the factor measuring private benefits of
control provided the buyer is a company outsider. Thus, outside buyers tend to screen CEOs using
estimates of both CEO quality and private control benefit.
We also find that the firms emerging from the bankruptcy auction perform well. Post-bankruptcy
operating profitability is at par with (healthy) industry rivals in every year over a five-year period
following the auction. The firms’ growth rates in sales and total assets and in capital expenditures
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are at par or above that of industry rivals. We also find that the post-bankruptcy operating per-
formance increases in our CEO quality factor. Greater control benefits and CEO quality reduces
the probability that the firm will refile for bankruptcy over the years following the initial filing,
suggesting reduced prefiling risk shifting.
Overall, our results indicate that a bankruptcy filing in the Swedish automatic auction system
is costly for the filing CEO and that the probability of the CEO maintaining her position depends
on publicly available information about control benefits and quality. We conclude that the ex
ante incentive effects of the managerial labor market transaction caused by bankruptcy filing help
explain why the firms emerging from the bankruptcy auctions as going concerns are economically
healthy. There is no empirical support for the alternative hypothesis that CEOs systematically run
down distressed firms by means of costly risk-shifting and asset-stripping strategies to stay out of
bankruptcy.
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Table 1 
Prefiling and auction characteristics for privately held Swedish firms filing for auction 
bankruptcy, 1988-1991. 
Characteristic 
Variable 
name Mean Median 
Standard 
error of the 
mean 
A. Prefiling firm characteristica    
Sales in millions of dollars  5.0 2.7 0.453 
Bookvalue of assets in millions of dollars size 2.4 1.3 0.225 
Number of employees  43 29 2.793 
Operating profitabilityb  -0.01 0.02 0.009 
Industry-adjusted operating profitabilityc profmarg -0.06 -0.04 0.008 
Debt-to-assets ratiod  0.92 0.93 0.013 
Interest-coverage ratioe  -2.32 1.02 2.198 
Proportion secured debt of total debt secured 0.39 0.38 0.153 
B. Chief executive officer (CEO) characteristic    
CEOs tenure exceeds two years (dummy)f tenure 0.65 1.00 0.030 
Fraction CEO equity ownership in the filing firmg ownership 0.57 0.60 0.030 
CEO age at filing age 45.1 46.0 0.456 
Prefiling income in thousands of dollarsh  39.7 26.0 5.062 
C. Auction characteristic     
Delay from insolvency to filing in monthsi delay 4.8 4.0 0.330 
CEO deemed incompetent by trustee (dummy) inept 0.32 0.00 0.029 
Debt recovery rate as a fraction of face value recovery 0.35 0.33 0.013 
D. Industry characteristic     
Industry distressj distress 0.42 0.38 0.010 
a The firm characteristics are from the financial statement last filed prior to bankruptcy filing, dated back 
on average 17.5 months (median 16.5 months), with exception of secured, which is from the bankruptcy file.   
b Operating profitability is EBITDA divided by total sales. 
c The firm’s operating profitability less the contemporaneous median operating profitability for all 
Swedish firms with 20 employees or more, and the same four-digit industry code as the sample firm. The 
mean (t-test) and median (Wilcoxon signed-rank test) are significantly different from 0 at the 1% level. 
d Book value of total debt divided by the book value of total assets.  
e EBITDA plus interest income divided by interest expense.  
f Fraction of CEOs in office two years prior to filing who are still in office at the time of bankruptcy filing.  
g CEO equity ownership includes ownership of spouses.  
h Net income before tax two years prior to filings, as reported in the CEO’s individual tax return.  
I The delay is based on the trustee’s estimate of when the firm became insolvent.  
j Industry distress is the fraction of all Swedish firms with at least 20 employees and the same four-digit 
standard industrial classification (SIC) code as the sample firm that either reports an interest coverage ratio 
of less than one in the year of filing, or files for bankruptcy during the next calendar year.  
Table 2 
Determinants of the chief executive officer (CEO) rehiring probability in the bankruptcy auction 
The table shows the coefficient estimates in the probit regressions for the probability α that the 
buyer in the auction rehires the incumbent CEO. The probability α is modeled as a function of 
the two factors control and quality, as well as the control variables age and distress: 
α = f(control, quality, age, distress). 
The dependent variable in the probit regression is a binary variable that takes on the value of 1 if 
the CEO is rehired and 0 otherwise. The factor control is a proxy for managerial private benefits 
of control, and the factor quality measures CEO quality, defined using the following CEO and 
firm characteristics: 
control ≡ ownership + tenure – secured – size* 
and 
quality ≡ recovery* + profmarg – inept – delay*. 
The characteristics for the factor control are defined as follows: ownership is percent CEO equity 
holding, tenure is a binary variable indicating that the CEO’s tenure with the firm exceeds two 
years, secured is the fraction of total debt that is secured, and size*=[ln(size)- s s, where size is 
the prefiling book value of assets and s and s are the mean and standard deviation of ln(size), 
respectively. The characteristics for the factor quality are defined as follows: recovery* is the 
square root of the creditor recovery rate recovery, profmarg is the firm’s industry-adjusted 
operating profitability, inept is a binary variable indicating that the bankruptcy trustee classified 
the CEO as incompetent, and delay* is the square root of delay divided by its standard deviation, 
where delay is the number of months from the trustee’s estimate of the insolvency date to the 
firm’s filing date. Moreover, saleback and external are binary variables indicating that the 
auctioned firm is sold as a going concern to the old owner and to a company outsider, 
respectively. The binary variable piecemeal indicates that the assets of the bankrupt firm are sold 
piecemeal in the auction. The variable age is the CEO’s age at filing, and distress is the degree of 
industrywide distress (see Table 1 for details). The sample is composed of 150 privately held 
Swedish firms filing for bankruptcy during 1988-1991 (p-values are in parentheses).  
   Going concern sales  All filings  
Explanatory variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant  -0.04  
(0.966) 
0.68    
(0.546) 
-0.09  
(0.914) 
0.16  
(0.870) 
CEO control benefits 
control  0.31  
(0.015) 
 0.25   
(0.022) 
 
control*saleback   0.55   
(0.000) 
 0.67   
(0.000) 
control*external   -0.14   
(0.543) 
 -0.01   
(0.963) 
control*piecemeal     -0.82   
(0.022) 
CEO quality reputation 
quality  0.48  
(0.018) 
 0.43  
(0.013) 
 
quality*saleback   0.22   
(0.349) 
 0.14   
(0.550) 
quality*external   1.42   
(0.011) 
 1.46   
(0.012) 
quality*piecemeal     1.33   
(0.126) 
age  0.01  
(0.581) 
-0.00   
(0.936) 
0.01  
(0.628) 
0.01  
(0.963) 
Industry control 
distress  -1.39  
(0.066) 
-1.79  
(0.031) 
-1.60  
(0.015) 
-2.02  
(0.009) 
Sample size 112 111 150 149 
Number of cases where 
the CEO is rehired 
56 56 56 56 
Pseudo R-square 0.08 0.21 0.08 0.30 
χ2 statistic for regression 12.7 
(0.013) 
32.9  
(0.000) 
15.2 
(0.004) 
59.2  
(0.000) 
Table 3 
Determinants of the chief executive officer (CEO) income loss around auction bankruptcy filing 
The table reports the ordinary least squares coefficient estimates in cross-sectional regressions of 
the CEO income loss γ=log (c-2/c3), where ct is the CEO’s income before tax in year t relative to the 
filing year (t = 0). The income loss γ is modeled as a function of the two factors control and 
quality, as well as the control variables age and distress: 
γ = f(control, quality, age, distress). 
The factor control is a proxy for managerial private benefits of control, and the factor quality 
measures CEO quality, defined using the following CEO and firm characteristics: 
control ≡ ownership + tenure – secured – size* 
and 
quality ≡ recovery* + profmarg – inept – delay*. 
The characteristics for the factor control are defined as follows: ownership is percent CEO equity 
holding, tenure is a binary variable indicating that the CEO’s tenure with the firm exceeds two 
years, secured is the fraction of total debt that is secured, and size* = [ln(size)- s s, where size is 
the prefiling book value of assets and s and s are the mean and standard deviation of ln(size), 
respectively. The characteristics for the factor quality are defined as follows: recovery* is the 
square root of the creditor recovery rate recovery, profmarg is the firm’s industry-adjusted 
operating profitability, inept is a binary variable indicating that the bankruptcy trustee classified 
the CEO as incompetent, and delay* is the square root of delay divided by its standard deviation, 
where delay is the number of months from the trustee’s estimate of the insolvency date to the 
firm’s filing date. Moreover, saleback and external are binary variables indicating that the 
auctioned firm is sold as a going concern to the old owner and to a company outsider, 
respectively. The binary variable piecemeal indicates that the assets of the bankrupt firm are sold 
piecemeal in the auction. The variable age is the CEO’s age at filing, and distress is the degree of 
industrywide distress (see Table 1 for details). The sample is composed of 114 privately held 
Swedish firms filing for bankruptcy 1990-1991 (p-values are in parentheses).  
 
   Going concern sales  All filings  
Explanatory variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
constant  -1.36   
(0.164) 
-1.23  
(0.215) 
-1.09   
(0.200) 
-1.00  
(0.200) 
CEO control benefits 
control  0.23 
(0.079) 
 0.12 
(0.297) 
 
control*saleback   0.09   
(0.572) 
 0.03   
(0.823) 
control*external   0.46   
(0.019) 
 0.47   
(0.008) 
control*piecemeal     -0.28   
(0.144) 
CEO quality reputation 
quality  0.16  
(0.457) 
 0.06  
(0.354) 
 
quality*saleback   0.19   
(0.467) 
 0.19   
(0.416) 
quality*external   0.02   
(0.951) 
 0.05   
(0.889) 
quality*piecemeal     0.18   
(0.616) 
age  0.02  
(0.319) 
0.02 
(0.426) 
0.02  
(0.354) 
0.01 
(0.448) 
Industry control 
distress  0.59  
(0.486) 
0.82  
(0.348) 
0.60  
(0.381) 
0.93  
(0.160) 
Sample size  85 83 114 111 
Adjusted R-square 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.06 
F statistic for 
regression 
1.38 
(0.249) 
 1.54  
(0.177) 
0.75   
(0.600) 
1.84 
(0.077) 
Table 4 
Five-year post-bankruptcy performance, growth, and leverage for 115 private Swedish firms 
auctioned in bankruptcy as going concerns, 1988-1991.  
   Firm value   Industry-adjusted value  
Event year ta Sample size Median  Fraction <0 Medianb   Fraction <0         
A. Operating profitability (EBITDA/sales)  
1 111 0.054 0.23 0.005 0.49 
2 103 0.043 0.21 - 0.007 0.54 
3 88 0.064 0.16 - 0.003 0.52 
4 85 0.079 0.15  0.001 0.47 
5 45 0.096 0.11  0.020*** 0.37 
B. Growth in sales 
[1, 2] 104 0.015 0.48 0.027 0.48 
[2,3] 88 0.076 0.32 0.029*** 0.45 
[3,4] 81 0.111 0.27 0.060 0.43 
[4,5] 45 0.040 0.42 -0.030 0.59 
C.: Growth in total book assets  
[1,2] 103 0.022 0.48 0.011 0.47 
[2,3] 89 0.029 0.43 -0.002 0.51 
[3,4] 83 0.077 0.36 0.010 0.48 
[4,5] 46 0.054 0.46 -0.023 0.52 
D. Capital expenditure/assetsc 
[1,2] 99 0.000 0.47 0.008 0.48 
[2,3] 84 0.000 0.34 0.020 0.48 
[3,4] 76 0.000 0.43 -0.036 0.59 
[4,5] 40 0.000 0.35 -0.045** 0.69 
E. Total book debt-to-assets ratio  
1 111 0.902  0.105* 0.28 
2 105 0.895  0.088* 0.27 
3 90 0.877  0.094* 0.32 
4 87 0.832  0.093* 0.36 
5 46 0.760  -0.001 0.50 
a Year t = 1 denotes the first year of operations following the bankruptcy auction.  
b Industry-adjusted median is the median difference between the firm and the median value for its 
industry rivals, where industry rivals are all Swedish firms with 20 employees or more and the same 
four-digit standard industrial classification code as the sample firm. The probability of rejecting the null 
hypothesis that the industry-adjusted value equals zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level is 
denoted *, **, and ***, respectively, using a two-tailed Wilcoxon singed-rank test. 
c Capital expenditure is the difference in book value of property, plant, and equipment from last year 
plus this year’s depreciation.  
Table 5 
Determinants of the post-bankruptcy industry-adjusted operating profitability following 
auction bankruptcy 
The table shows coefficient estimates for ordinary least squares regressions of the post-
bankruptcy industry-adjusted operating profitability πt cumulated over years t = 1 and t = 2, 
where year 0 is the year of the bankruptcy auction. πt is defined as the difference between the 
firm’s operating profitability (EBITDA/sales) and the contemporaneous median operating 
profitability for all Swedish firms with at least 20 employees and the same four-digit standard 
industrial classification code. The cumulative operating profitability is modeled as a function of 
the two factors control and quality, as well as the control variables distress and merger: 
∑t t
e 1
π
 = f(control, quality, distress, merger),     t = 1,2. 
The factor control is a proxy for managerial private benefits of control, and the factor quality 
measures chief executive officer (CEO) quality, defined using the following CEO and firm 
characteristics: 
control ≡ ownership + tenure – secured – size* 
and 
quality ≡ recovery* + profmarg – inept – delay*. 
The characteristics for the factor control are defined as follows: ownership is percent CEO equity 
holding, tenure is a binary variable indicating that the CEO’s tenure with the firm exceeds two 
years, secured is the fraction of total debt that is secured, and size* = [ln(size)- s s, where size is 
the prefiling book value of assets and s and s are the mean and standard deviation of ln(size), 
respectively. The characteristics for the factor quality are defined as follows: recovery* is the 
square root of the creditor recovery rate recovery, profmarg is the firm’s industry-adjusted 
operating profitability, inept is a binary variable indicating that the bankruptcy trustee classified 
the CEO as incompetent, and delay* is the square root of delay divided by its standard deviation, 
where delay is the number of months from the trustee’s estimate of the insolvency date to the 
firm’s filing date. Moreover, saleback and external are binary variables indicating that the 
auctioned firm is sold as a going concern to the old owner and to a company outsider, 
respectively. The binary variable piecemeal indicates that the assets of the bankrupt firm are sold 
piecemeal in the auction. Finally, distress is the degree of industrywide distress (see Table 1 for 
details), and the binary variable merger indicates that the buyer in the auction merged the 
bankrupt firm’s assets into another going concern (and not into an empty corporate shell). The 
sample is composed of 66 privately held Swedish firms auctioned as a going concern, 1988-1991 
(p-values are in parentheses).  
   Dependent variable: industry-adjusted operating profitability π  
  Year 1: 1eπ   Year 1 and 2: 1 2eπ π+   
Explanatory variable  Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2  
constant  1.04   
(0.000) 
1.04   
(0.000) 
1.07  
(0.000) 
1.06   
(0.000) 
CEO control benefits 
control  -0.01    
(0.405) 
 -0.05   
(0.163) 
 
control*saleback   -0.01   
(0.585) 
 -0.03   
(0.467) 
control*external   -0.02   
(0.466) 
 -0.08   
(0.135) 
CEO quality reputation 
quality  0.06    
(0.050) 
 0.08    
(0.182) 
 
quality*saleback   0.08    
(0.043) 
 0.09    
(0.277) 
quality*external   0.03    
(0.587) 
 0.03    
(0.784) 
Industry control 
distress  -0.07      
(0.534) 
-0.06   
(0.565) 
-0.09   
(0.699) 
-0.07   
(0.752) 
merger  0.05       
(0.121) 
0.05    
(0.167) 
0.19     
(0.014) 
0.21     
(0.014) 
Sample size  66 66 60 60 
Adjusted R-square 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.07 
F statistic of 
regression 
2.11 
(0.090) 
1.51  
(0.192) 
2.66   
(0.042) 
1.82  
(0.135) 
Table 6 
Determinants of the bankruptcy refiling probability 
The table shows the coefficient estimates for probit regressions of the probability δt that the firm 
refiles for bankruptcy within t years of the original bankruptcy auction, where t = [1,2,3]. The 
refiling probability δt is modeled as a function of the two factors control and quality, as well as the 
control variables distress and merger: 
δt = f(control, quality, distress, merger),     t = 1,2,3. 
The dependent variable in the probit regression is a binary variable that takes on the value of 1 if 
the firm refiles within t years of the bankruptcy auction and 0 otherwise. The factor control is a 
proxy for managerial private benefits of control, and the factor quality measures CEO quality, 
defined using the following CEO and firm characteristics: 
control ≡ ownership + tenure – secured – size* 
and 
quality ≡ recovery* + profmarg – inept – delay*. 
The characteristics for the factor control are defined as follows: ownership is percent CEO equity 
holding, tenure is a binary variable indicating that the CEO’s tenure with the firm exceeds two 
years, secured is the fraction of total debt that is secured, and size* = [ln(size)- s s, where size is 
the prefiling book value of assets and s and s are the mean and standard deviation of ln(size), 
respectively. The characteristics for the factor quality are defined as follows: recovery* is the 
square root of the creditor recovery rate recovery, profmarg is the firm’s industry-adjusted 
operating profitability, inept is a binary variable indicating that the bankruptcy trustee classified 
the CEO as incompetent, and delay* is the square root of delay divided by its standard deviation, 
where delay is the number of months from the trustee’s estimate of the insolvency date to the 
firm’s filing date. Moreover, saleback and external are binary variables indicating that the 
auctioned firm is sold as a going concern to the old owner and to a company outsider, 
respectively. The binary variable piecemeal indicates that the assets of the bankrupt firm are sold 
piecemeal in the auction. Finally, distress is the degree of industrywide distress (see Table 1 for 
details), and the binary variable merger indicates that the buyer in the auction merged the 
bankrupt firm’s assets into another going concern (and not into an empty corporate shell). The 
sample is composed of 94 privately held Swedish firms auctioned as a going concern, 1988-1991 
(p-values are in parentheses).  
   Dependent variable: bankruptcy refiling within t years  
 t = 1  t = 2  t = 3  
Explanatory variable Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2  
constant  -1.83   
(0.003) 
-2.03   
(0.003) 
-1.57   
(0.001) 
-1.73   
(0.000) 
-1.36  
(0.001) 
-1.52    
(0.001) 
CEO control benefits 
control  0.11  
(0.585) 
 -0.26   
(0.074) 
 -0.20   
(0.145) 
 
control*saleback   0.22  
(0.297) 
 -0.15   
(0.347) 
 -0.09   
(0.546) 
control*external   -0.37   
(0.442) 
 -0.66   
(0.026) 
 -0.59  
(0.031) 
CEO quality reputation 
quality  -0.52    
(0.105) 
 -0.46    
(0.061) 
 -0.51   
(0.027) 
 
quality*saleback   -0.83    
(0.032) 
 -0.63    
(0.028) 
 -0.66   
(0.016) 
quality*external   0.22    
(0.832) 
 -0.39    
(0.472) 
 -0.61   
(0.219) 
Industry control 
distress  0.37   
(0.753) 
0.36   
(0.773) 
2.09   
(0.019) 
2.23   
(0.017) 
2.03   
(0.018) 
2.20   
(0.014) 
merger  0.50  
(0.913) 
0.46  
(0.386) 
0.18  
(0.602) 
0.45  
(0.241) 
0.19  
(0.562) 
0.43  
(0.231) 
Sample size  94  94 94 94 94 94 
Number of 
cases where 
firm refiles 
8 8 25 25 35 32 
Pseudo R-square 0.06 0.15 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.13 
χ2 statistic for 
regression 
 3.54 
(0.472) 
 8.15 
(0.227) 
10.2   
(0.037) 
 14.15        
(0.025) 
11.8   
(0.026) 
15.6   
(0.016) 
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Fig. 2. Frequency distribution of the percentage chief executive officer (CEO) equity ownership in 
205 privately held Swedish firms filing for bankruptcy, 1988-1991. 
 
 
Number of bankruptcy auctions 
Percent of the total equity in the auctioned firm owned by the CEO  
  
 
Fig. 3. Evolution of a median income index for chief executive officers (CEOs) of bankrupt and 
nonbankrupt firms. The figure plots the annual values of 1ˆ ˆ
m
t t tc c c−= ∆ , where 
m
tc∆  is the median 
rate of change in CEO taxable income 1 1( ) /t t t tc c c c− −∆ = − , and 3ˆ 100c− ≡ . Year t is the year relative 
to the year of bankruptcy filing (year 0). The lower index represents CEOs of firms filing for 
bankruptcy, while the upper index represents CEOs of non-bankrupt firms matched on four-
digit industry and asset size. The total sample is composed of 258 privately held Swedish firms 
filing for bankruptcy, 1988-1991. 
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